Mara Faccio

Krannert School of Management
Purdue University
403 W. State Street
West Lafayette, IN 47907
Tel: 765/496-1951

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
NBER Program Affiliations: CF
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate
Institutional Affiliation: Purdue University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2020Impediments to the Schumpeterian Process in the Replacement of Large Firms
with John J. McConnell: w27871
Using newly-assembled data encompassing up to 75 countries and starting circa 1910, we find that the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction aptly describes the replacement of large firms by other firms, but exceptions to the norm of replacement are not rare and replacement is often not by new firms. Initial firm size and political connections represent the main obstacles to the Schumpeterian process while board interlocks and a corporate culture of innovation play modest roles. Consistent with a theory of political capture, when accompanied by regulations that restrict entry, political connections play a formidable role in abetting large firms remaining large.
May 2019Business Groups and the Incorporation of Firm-specific Shocks into Stock Prices
with Randall Morck, M. Deniz Yavuz: w25908
In lower-income economies, stocks exhibit less idiosyncratic volatility and business groups are more prevalent. This study connects these two findings by showing that business group affiliated firms’ stock returns exhibit less idiosyncratic volatility than do the returns of otherwise similar unaffiliated firms. Global commodity price shocks are common shocks that contribute to firm-level idiosyncratic risk because they affect industries heterogeneously. Idiosyncratic components of commodity shocks are incorporated less into idiosyncratic returns of group affiliates than unaffiliated firms in the same industry and economy. Identification follows from difference-in-difference tests exploiting successful and matched-exogenously-failed control block transactions.
February 2018Death by Pokémon GO: The Economic and Human Cost of Using Apps While Driving
with John J. McConnell: w24308
Using police accident reports for Tippecanoe County, Indiana, and exploiting the introduction of the augmented reality game Pokémon GO as a natural experiment, we document a disproportionate increase in crashes and associated vehicular damage, injuries, and fatalities in the vicinity of locations where users can play the game while driving. We estimate the incremental county-wide cost of users playing Pokémon GO while driving to be in the range of $5.2 to $25.5 million over the 148 days following the introduction of the game. Extrapolating these estimates to nation-wide levels yields a total ranging from $2.0 to $7.3 billion.

Published: Mara Faccio & John J. McConnell, 2020. "Death by Pokémon GO: The Economic and Human Cost of Using Apps While Driving," Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol 87(3), pages 815-849.

January 2017Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry
with Luigi Zingales: w23041
We study how political factors shape competition in the mobile telecommunication sector. We show that the way a government designs the rules of the game has an impact on concentration, competition, and prices. Pro-competition regulation reduces prices, but does not hurt quality of services or investments. More democratic governments tend to design more competitive rules, while more politically connected operators are able to distort the rules in their favor, restricting competition. Government intervention has large redistributive effects: U.S. consumers would gain $65bn a year if U.S. mobile service prices were in line with German ones and $44bn if they were in line with Danish ones.
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