Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin-Madison
1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Faculty Research Fellow
Institutional Affiliation: University of Wisconsin-Madison
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|August 2020||Government Advertising in Market-Based Public Programs: Evidence from the Health Insurance Marketplace|
with : w27695
This paper studies government and private marketing activities in the context of the Affordable Care Act health insurance marketplace. Using detailed TV advertising data, we present evidence that government and private advertising are targeted to different geographical areas and provide different messaging content. Then, we estimate the impacts of government and private advertising on consumer demand by exploiting discontinuities in advertising along the borders of local TV markets. We find that government advertising has a market-expansion effect and enhances welfare. We also find that private advertising is not more effective than government advertising in increasing total program enrollment. Although private advertising is still effective in increasing insurer’s own enrollment, it does ...
|July 2020||Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled|
with , : w27478
This paper studies the optimal design of social insurance programs for disabled workers by developing and estimating an equilibrium labor search model with screening contracts. In the model, firms may strategically use employment contracts, consisting of wage and job amenities, to screen out the disabled. The optimal structure of disability policies depends on firms' screening incentives, which may distort employment rates and contracts. By exploiting policy changes on the labor demand side for the disabled in the United States, we identify and estimate our equilibrium model to explore the optimal joint design of disability policies, including disability insurance (DI) and subsidies to firms accommodating disabled workers. We find that firm subsidies mitigate screening distortions; at the ...
|January 2020||Interaction of the Labor Market and the Health Insurance System: Employer-Sponsored, Individual, and Public Insurance|
with : w26713
We study regulations on the health insurance system for working-age U.S. households, consisting of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI), individual health insurance exchange (HIX), and Medicaid. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model with rich heterogeneity across local markets, households, and firms, which highlights the inter-relationship between various components of the health insurance system as well as their relationship with the labor market. We estimate the model exploiting variations across states and policy environments before and after the Affordable Care Act. In counterfactual experiments, we consider policies to cross subsidize between ESHI and HIX, which include pure risk pooling between the two markets as a special case. We find such policies would benefit most h...
|January 2013||Equilibrium Labor Market Search and Health Insurance Reform|
with : w18698
We present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where risk averse workers facing medical expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions. Our model delivers a rich set of predictions that can account for a wide variety of phenomenon observed in the data including the correlations among firm sizes, wages, health insurance offering rates, turnover rates and workers' health compositions. We estimate our model by Generalized Method of Moments using a combination of micro data sources including Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey. We use our estimated model to evaluate the equilibrium impact of the 2010 Affo...